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We live at a time when our understandings and conceptualizations of ‘racism’ are 
often highly imprecise, broad, and used to describe a wide range of racialized 
phenomena. In this article, I raise some important questions about  how the term 
racism is used and understood in contemporary British society by drawing on some 
recent  cases of alleged  racism in football  and politics, many of which have been 
played  out  via  new  media  technologies. A  broader  understanding of  racism, 
through the use of the term ‘racialization’, has been helpful in articulating a more 
nuanced   and  complex  understanding of  racial  incidents,  especially  of  people’s 
(often  ambivalent) beliefs and behaviours. However,  the growing emphasis  upon 
‘racialization’ has led to a conceptualization of racism which increasingly  involves 
multiple  perpetrators, victims, and practices  without  enough  consideration of how 
and why particular interactions and practices  constitute racism as such. The trend 
toward a growing culture of racial equivalence is worrying, as it denudes the idea of 
racism of its historical basis, severity and power. These frequent and commonplace 
assertions of racism in the public sphere  paradoxically end up trivializing and 
homogenizing quite  different forms of racialized  interactions. I conclude  that  we 
need to retain the term ‘racism’, but we need to differentiate more clearly between 
‘racism’ (as an historical  and structured system of domination) from the broader 
notion  of ‘racialization’. 
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We appear to be living through a time when our awareness  of racial identity, 
and  of the  dangers  of committing  racial  indiscretions (at  least  publicly),  is 
very  high  indeed.  We  also  live  at  a  time  when  our  understandings and 






describe  a wide range of racialized  phenomena. Various  scholars have argued 
that, while forms of racism continue to flourish, we are much less certain about 
what ‘racism’ means. 
In this article, I raise some pressing questions about  how the term ‘racism’ is 
used and understood in contemporary British society. As Robert Miles (1989), 
and George Frederickson (2002), among  others,  have argued,  the concept  of 
racism has suffered  from conceptual inflation, resulting  in the declining utility 
of this important concept. This article examines the dangers of its over-use; yet I 
argue for the retention of ‘racism’ and the need  to be as precise as possible 
when we use this concept. In recent  years, popular usage of the term racism is 
widespread in describing  a diverse range of racialized phenomena. Related to 
this, charges of ‘reverse racism’ abound, suggesting an implicit equivalence to 
the disparate and multiple  forms of racialized interactions, practices, and poli- 
cies which are  discussed  and  reported – what  I call an emerging  culture of 
racial equivalence.  In order  to  illustrate this culture  of racial  equivalence, I 
draw upon some recent  racial controversies which have received  much atten- 
tion in the British media, especially those  occurring  on the football  pitch. 
This  is an  interesting historical   moment   to  consider   these  questions  in 
Britain:   In   the   wake   of  Stephen  Lawrence’s   murder  in  1993,  and   the 
Macpherson Report’s (1999) framing and recognition of ‘institutional racism’ 
(especially in contrast to the 1981 Scarman Report), to the individualization of 
racism and the growing dominance of ‘colour blind’, post-race  discourses,  we 
have lost sight of the need to understand and specify the changing definitions 
and dynamics of ‘racism’. Furthermore, analyses of ‘race relations’  in contem- 
porary  Britain  have  increasingly  noted  the  public’s  preoccupation with  the 
Muslim ‘other’ and ‘community cohesion’, which has not abated since 9/11, the 
‘riots’ in the Northern cities, and more recently, the murder of the soldier Lee 
Rigby in Woolwich. 
Not only is Britain  demographically much changed  since Macpherson, but 
popular understandings and  reportage of ‘racist’ incidents  have  been  trans- 
formed   by  the  widespread  use  of  (relatively)  new  media   forms  such  as 
Facebook, Twitter, and You Tube. As will be illustrated in this article, contem- 
porary  understandings of allegedly racist incidents  are often played out in the 
realms  of popular culture  and  politics, and  mediated by sound  bite  technol- 
ogies and the seemingly  endless  opportunity for anonymous punters to reply 
to and comment  upon  a huge array  of reports (Gilroy  2012). 
Allegations of racism in football  will be remembered as making major 
headlines in the last several years, and are unlikely to abate  anytime  soon. In 
October 2011, John Terry  (the  England  captain  and Chelsea  defender) faced 
criminal charges for racial abuse on the field against Anton Ferdinand, a Black 
(and ‘mixed race’) player for Queens  Park Rangers – a first ever prosecution 
brought  by  the  CPS  (Longman  2011). Terry   was  charged   with  violating 




‘antisocial behaviour’. Although he was not convicted in the magistrate’s  court 
in July 2012, he was later  found  guilty of racial abuse by the Football  Associ- 
ation’s  independent commission,  and  given a four  match  ban  and  a fine of 
£220,000. Since then,  controversies about  racism  in football  have  continued, 
most recently concerning the racial abuse Yaya Toure encountered in Moscow. 
As a result, some Black players refused  to wear the ‘Kick it Out’ t-shirts as a 
protest against the inefficacy of the KIO campaign in curbing racist behaviour 
on  the  pitch,  and  there  is even  talk  of the  formation of a  separate  Black 
football  association. 
The Terry/Ferdinand case has ignited much debate about  not only the state 
of English football, but also about  whether Terry is, or is not, racist. While the 
Terry/Ferdinand case is perhaps a typical example  of racism, as popularly 
understood (one  which involves a White ‘perpetrator’ and  a Black ‘victim’), 
other  recent  cases are shaping what the public conceives of as racism, includ- 
ing allegations of ‘reverse  racism’. For  instance,  shifting  to the  halls of Par- 
liament,  Black Labour MP Dianne Abbott was recently  embroiled in a ‘race 
row’ of  her  own, in  which  she  was  given  a  very  public  dressing-down for 
making  allegedly  racist remarks about  White  people. As I will discuss below, 
there  is a growing tendency in Britain  to regard  almost any form of racial 
statement, made  by anyone  (of  any  hue),  as automatically, and  indiscrimi- 
nately, ‘racist’. 
Given  the prevalence of media  headlines alleging the racist behaviours of 
football  players, members  of Parliament, and reality  television  stars, and the 
frequent reference to people in a variety of societal situations and interactions 
as racist, it is surprising  that  relatively  little has been  written  explicitly about 
contemporary definitions  and understandings of racism in Britain, which 
addresses the thorny  question of what exactly constitutes racism, and who or 
what can (or cannot)  be racist. The many instances  that  have received  atten- 
tion in Britain  in recent  years (as on the football  pitch) suggest that while the 
dominant understanding of racism is still one in which a White person  or 
institution is the  perpetrator of racism  (Miles  and  Brown  2003), the  implicit 
assumption – that any racial attribution, regardless of who has made it (or the 
specific context  in which it is made), constitutes racism – increasingly  charac- 
terizes  most  of the  popular discussion  and  reportage of racial  incidents  in 
Britain. 
One  key  danger  is that  an  all-purpose and  widespread use  of  the  term 
‘racism’ fails to differentiate between  quite disparate forms of racialization, by 
lumping  all racialized  phenomena under  its umbrella. In fact, older  debates 
concerning ‘racialism’ versus ‘racism’ revealed how difficult (and elusive) it can 
be to define and to agree upon a set of clear criteria for what constitutes racism 
as such. For  instance,  the  philosopher Kwame  Anthony Appiah (1990) con- 
ceived of ‘racialism’ as the [mistaken]  belief that there are distinctive heritable 
characteristics which are present in human  beings who can be divided up into 
  
 
so-called races (and see Benedict 1945). According  to Appiah, although ‘racial- 
ism’ is misguided,  he  would  not  assign  the  term  ‘racism’ to  such  a  belief, 
because while racialism entails the essentialization of racial groups, it does not 
necessarily  attribute inferiority or superiority to such alleged  differences 
(Frederickson 2002). In Britain  today, Appiah’s  conceptualization of ‘racial- 
ism’ (involving racially essentialist beliefs and attributions) constitutes one of 
the ways in which racism is now understood. 
The growing recognition of racism’s plural character (and its many possible 
incarnations), for  instance   racisms  directed  at  specific  groups   (e.g.  anti- 
Semitism) is important, but to conceive of this term so broadly (and in relation 
to such diverse people  and phenomena) results in an overly loose understand- 
ing of racism  in which we are  all potentially racists  or the  victims of racism 
(Song 2003). Given  the  ubiquity  and  inflation  of the  term  ‘racism’ (or  some 
conceptual variant), some scholars, such as McGhee (2005), have responded to 
this  difficulty  by  theorizing  contemporary  forms  of  othering   and  hatred 
through a  wider  vocabulary – ‘. . . racism,  asylophobia, Islamophobia and 
homophobia in the UK . . .’ (2005: 3). And  while this work provides  a strong 
examination of these differing, but related phenomena, based upon hatred and 
prejudice,  the term ‘racism’ is never defined, but treated, rather, as an obvious 
given. 
I argue that  rather than  backing away from tricky concepts  like racism, we 
need to refocus ‘racism’ as an important concept  which captures  the multiple 
and  varied  racial  phenomena and  interactions occurring   in  contemporary 
British society. In particular, assertions of racism need to be unpacked so that 
we know how and why particular interactions are said to be racist, and whether 
these  social  phenomena can  be  understood as ontologically equivalent, or 




Changing understandings of racism 
 
Let  us start  by reviewing  some  older  bodies  of research, and  conceptuali- 
zations of racism, and how they have changed  over time, from classical formu- 
lations  to  more  recent,  postmodern understandings of  racism.  This  article 
cannot  provide  a comprehensive account  of the  evolution of racial  thinking 
and discourses  (see Benedict 1945; Banton 1977; Montagu 1964). There  is no 
one  continuous strand  of thinking  or debates  concerning race and  racism  in 
Britain,  and  I will draw  upon  both  British  and American scholars  who have 
written  about  ‘racism’ in a wide variety of ways. 
In Britain, older debates  about ‘race relations’  centered upon making sense 
of why ethnic minority  people, many of them immigrants (at that time), 
encountered differential and  often  discriminatory treatment in relation to a 




1967). These  older  debates  also questioned whether structured power  differ- 
entials  between  Black  people  and White  people  meant  that  ethnic  minority 
people  could not be regarded as racist (see e.g. Sivanandan 1982). 
The ‘race relations’  framework was followed  by Marxist  theorists such as 
Miles (1989) who conceived  of a process  of ‘racialization’  in which specific 
sectors of the population were regarded as racialized minorities  in the context 
of  the  capitalist  world  economy.  However,  the  neo-Marxist perspective of 
scholars  associated  with the  Centre for Contemporary Cultural  Studies  (e.g. 
Stuart  Hall, Hazel  Carby, John  Solomos, Paul Gilroy)  noted  that  it was prob- 
lematic to conceive of a capitalist  class as all-controlling, and that a less 
deterministic way of thinking  was needed to make sense of contemporary 
racialized  interactions and ideologies, including a consideration of how White 
working-class  people  adopted racist beliefs. Rather, these  British  scholars 
emphasized the ways in which ethnic minority people actively resisted forms of 
racism, which were constantly  changing. 
A number of analysts  have noted  that  the concept  of ‘racism’ ‘entered the 
lexicon  of “common sense”  only  in the  1960s’ (Winant 1998: 757). Indeed, 
various  scholars  have  argued  that  racism  as we know  it today  is historically 
modern (see  Hannaford 1996; Goldberg 2002; Frederickson 2002; Lentin 
2008). Scholars and lay people  use the term ‘racism’ to refer to racial epithets, 
stereotypes, ideologies, beliefs, physical attacks, policies, institutions, and states. 
As Ben Bowling (1998: 2) points out, ‘The process of naming the problem is not 
simply a matter of semantics  but reflects the intensely  political process of 
conceptualization.’2  Furthermore, various scholars have questioned the use of 
‘race’ and its limitations  as a critical concept  (see St. Louis 2002). 
Among  the various  conceptualizations of racism, some scholars  emphasize 
individual  (and  group)  processes  concerning racial  prejudice,  while  others 
address    more   collective,   societal   dynamics,   and   an   analysis   of   power 
differentials. These are not strictly competing  explanations – often, they shade 
into each other, with different emphases. For instance, in a widely read sociol- 
ogy textbook, Macionis  and  Plummer  define  racism  thus: ‘A  powerful  and 
destructive form  of prejudice,  racism  refers  to the  belief  that  one  racial  cat- 
egory is innately  superior or inferior  to another’  (2012: 354). One  scholar  of 
race  and  racism, John  Solomos  (1993: 9), argues  that  ‘. . . racism  is broadly 
defined  in the  sense  that  it is used to cover  those  ideologies  and  social pro- 
cesses which discriminate against others  on the basis of their putatively differ- 
ent racial membership’. And as many analysts point out, racism is not a static 
phenomenon, so that it can be expressed and manifest  in multiple  forms (Fox 
2012; Garner 2009). 
While some analysts distinguish between racial prejudice and racial dis- 
crimination, others   do  not.  In  The  Nature  of  Prejudice,  Gordon  Allport’s 
(1954) definition  of racial  discrimination is distinct  from  prejudice;  Allport 
argues  that  discrimination is the behavioural component of prejudice,  which 
  
 
may remain  latent. As Michael  Banton (2002) has observed, unlike  the term 
racism, racial discrimination can be defined  more  precisely and concretely,  as 
evidenced in the UN declaration of human rights: within this declaration, racial 
discrimination is understood as a violation  of legally defined  human  rights, 
with  specific  forms   of  legal  redress   by  governments.  However,   popular 
use of the term racism has tended to conflate racial prejudice  and racial 
discrimination (Banton 1997). 
Yet for social psychologists  Operario and Fiske (1998), racial oppression is 
said to be fundamentally based upon both racial prejudice  and power (with an 
emphasis  upon  how and  why it is still widespread): ‘Racial  oppression thus 
derives  from  a) power  – the  disproportionate ability  of some  individuals  or 
groups  to control  other  people’s  outcomes;  and  b) prejudice  – the  universal 
tendency to favour the in-group  over the out-group’  (1998: 49). Without both 
of these  key  variables,  they  argue  that  ‘racism  could  not  manifest  itself  as 
individual-,  institutional-, and  cultural-level phenomena’. As they  point  out, 
power is crucial to our understanding of what we call racism because states and 
societies  historically  have  had  the  power  to  arbitrarily create  and  enforce 
racial  classifications  in which some  people  are  regarded as more  physically, 
mentally, and culturally superior than others (Spickard 1992), enact race-based 
laws, and  the  power  to subordinate people  through forms of social and  eco- 
nomic control (Operario and Fiske 1998:38; see also Sidanius and Pratto 1999). 
Thus more radical, structural, and systemic understandings of racism see it as 
a web  of structural and  institutional arrangements (see  Blauner 1972; Hall 
et al. 1978; Sivanandan 1982; Wellman  1999; Feagin 2000; Bonilla-Silva  2010). 
According  to such a perspective, racism is institutionalized, based on a system 
in which the White majority ‘raises its position  by exploiting, controlling, and 
keeping  down others  who are categorized in racial or ethnic  terms’ (Blauner 
1972). These  structural analysts  challenge  purely  psychological  and individu- 
alistic views of racism: racism has an objective reality (and is not just located in 
someone’s prejudicial  view). In other words, racism is systemic, comprehensive 
(all  actors  involved),  and  rational, based  on  the  interests   of White  people 
(Wellman  1999; Feagin  2000). According  to Wellman: 
 
A position is racist when it defends, protects or enhances  social organization 
based  on racial advantage. Racism  is determined by the consequences of a 
sentiment, not  its surface  qualities  . . . White  racism  is what White  people 
do  to  protect the  special  benefits  they  gain  by virtue  of their  skin  color. 
(1999: 187) 
 
In fact, various  US scholars have argued  that  intentionality is not a prerequi- 
site for racism: ‘Racism is often  habitual, unintentional, commonplace, polite, 
implicit and well meaning’ (Desmond and Emirbayer 2008). Importantly, these 




perpetuated for White privilege, and should be understood in terms of its 
consequences, whatever  the intentions (Carmichael and Hamilton 1968). 
These formulations of racism have tended to conceive of power in quite bald 
terms – i.e. White people  characterized as empowered, while ethnic minorities 
are the powerless  victims of racism. However,  some analysts, such as Michael 
Omi and Howard Winant (1994), have advanced a theory  of ‘racial formation’ 
(in which they discuss a variety of ‘racial projects’)  which is more nuanced. In 
one  of the  most  influential  books  on racism  in the  USA,  the  authors define 
racism ‘. . . as a fundamental characteristic of social projects  which create or 
reproduce  structures  of  domination based  on  essentialist categories of  race’ 
(1994: 162 (my emphasis)). This definition is especially helpful because racially 
essentialist claims on their own are not sufficient to constitute ‘racism’ as such; 
rather, such essentialist categories or ways of thinking must be shown to ‘create 
or reproduce structures of domination’ in specific historical  contexts. Omi and 
Winant  criticize  the  mechanistic   and  additive  equation in  which  racism  = 
prejudice  plus power,  which draws  upon  a monolithic notion  of power  in a 
wholly top-down fashion. As they point  out, other  than  in absolutist regimes 
(such as the former South Africa), even relatively disadvantaged ethnic minor- 
ities are not powerless  – i.e. in societies  such as Britain,  power  is diffuse and 
situated at various  levels and sites (Song 2003).3 
Nevertheless, the recognition of the diffuse nature of contemporary power 
dynamics does not mean that we should lose sight of the differential distribu- 
tion and manifestations of power, or the relatively  negative  or positive social 
values embedded in disparate forms of racial  essentialisms which are  attrib- 
uted to disparate ‘racial’ groups. As discussed below, the importance of ‘struc- 
tures  of domination’, history,  and  racial  ideologies  for  many  contemporary 
debates  about ‘racism’ has been largely obscured by a postmodern theorizing 
on ‘racialization’, which, despite its limitations, has been helpful in advancing a 
more  subtle  understanding of racial incidents. 
 
 
Old  to ‘new’ racism 
 
Important changes in the status and experiences of ethnic minority  people  in 
many  multi-ethnic Western  societies,  as  well  as  growing  attention to  the 
assumed  privileges  of Whiteness (see Bhopal  2011; Garner 2009), has engen- 
dered  a great  deal  of debate about  how  to  characterize minority  people’s 
status and experiences. In the post-civil rights period, we have witnessed 
considerable mobility for some sectors of the ethnic minority  population. Not 
only are direct and indirect forms of discrimination illegal, as stipulated in the 
Race Relations Act of 1976, the Race Relations Act 2000 placed an obligation 
on thousands of public authorities to ‘promote  good relations between  persons 
of different racial groups’. We know that  not all ethnic  minority  groups  fare 
badly  in  socioeconomic  terms,  especially   Britons   of  Indian   and  Chinese 
  
 
backgrounds. In fact, a higher proportion of people from many ethnic minority 
groups enter  university than do White people  (Modood 2004). Nevertheless, a 
recent  and comprehensive report by the Human Rights  and Equalities Com- 
mission, ‘How Fair is Britain’, and the numerous reports by The Runnymede 
Trust,  still  shows  persistent forms  of  racialized  inequalities among  certain 
groups. 
Legislation formally banning  various forms of ethnic and racial discrimina- 
tion has resulted in what some analysts call ‘new racism’ (or ‘cultural racism’) 
(Barker 1981; Taguieff 2001), which has largely replaced the more blatant, ‘old’ 
forms of racism. As argued by Barker (1981) and the Centre for Contemporary 
Cultural  Studies  (CCCS  1982), among  others,  the  discursive  articulation of 
racism has changed, given the public prohibition on overt expressions  of racial 
hatred or disdain. With the decline in nineteenth century  scientific racism and 
the  horrors of the  Holocaust, publicly  racial  discourses  based  on biological 
notions  of superiority or inferiority among  races are no longer  intellectually 
or  politically  viable  (Modood 1997: 154; Montagu 1964). The  Macpherson 
Report’s definition  of racism acknowledges its more  subtle  manifestations: 
 
Racism in general terms consists of conduct or words or practices which 
disadvantage or advantage people  because of their colour, culture, or ethnic 
origin.  In  its  more  subtle  form  it  is  as  damaging  as  in  its  overt  form. 
(Macpherson Report 1999) 
 
Furthermore, racism is understood to arise in relation to a number of factors – 
not  only  colour,  but  also  culture,  ethnicity,  and  religion.  The  increasingly 
sanitized   and  ‘cultural’  attributions of  difference  have,  nevertheless, been 
employed to suggest  indelible  and  problematic cultural  differences between 
people   of  different ethnicities   and/or  religions,  for  instance   in  relation to 
discourses about traditional cultural practices and the putative ‘backwardness’ 
of Asian  Muslims  (see  CCCS  1982; Alexander 2000; Modood 1996; Gilroy 
1987; Barker 1981). Another characteristic of this new racism is its reliance  on a 
‘banal nationalism’  which effectively  excludes  minority  ethnic  people  from 
belonging in the nation (Billig 1995; McGhee 2005). Such newer forms of racial 
discourse  draw  upon  commonplace forms of explanation employed by ordi- 
nary people, as opposed  to either extremist  groups or blatant bigots (Wetherell 
and Potter 1992; Bonilla-Silva  2010; Wellman  1999). 
In Britain, discourses of race and ethnic minority status and racism have also 
been  significantly shaped  by a number of demographic changes: First, migra- 
tion  and ‘super-diversity’  (Vertovec 2007), especially  from  the  enlarged EU 
post-2004, has introduced ethnic minority  people  who are clearly foreign, yet 
White  – prompting debate about  forms of racism  targeted at White  Eastern 
European migrants  (such as Polish migrants) and about  the usual coupling of 
minority  status  and  ‘colour’  (see  Fox  2012). Second,  there  has  also  been  a 




discussion  about  the continuing  salience of race and racial boundaries across 
an increasingly  diverse  British  population (Aspinall  and  Song 2013). Third, 
understandings of racial disadvantage have also been  shaped  by the recogni- 
tion   of  White   working-class   disadvantage  (Reay,   David,   Ball  2005),  for 
instance, in relation to educational attainment – so that minority ethnic people 





Racialization, intersectionality and the broadening out of racism 
 
Accompanying this gradual  shift from ‘old’ to ‘new’ racism, and these  demo- 
graphic changes, is the growing use of the term ‘racialization’. While there is no 
one  conceptualization of racialization (and  some  analysts  use  this  term  as 
distinct  from ‘racism’ while others  do not), various  analysts  have argued  that 
racialization is the process of creating racial categories, or the process by which 
(usually)  non-whites have been  socially constructed (see Banton 1997; Miles 
1989; Lentin  2008). 
 
According  to Ali Rattansi, 
‘This [racialization] acknowledges that propositions, insults, and more elabo- 
rate  doctrines  are  liable  to  vary  in the  degree  to  which they  contain  the 
elements of what I have referred to as ‘strong’ or ‘hard’ racism. (2007: 107) 
 
Thus while some forms of racialization may elicit explicit and extremely nega- 
tive beliefs  about  the  innate  inferiority of a group,  other  forms  may invoke 
beliefs and images which are less extreme and more double-edged. So one key 
way in which the notion of racialization is helpful is that rather than ascertain- 
ing whether an interaction or event  is, or is not, racist, it entails  a relativistic 
assessment of each racial interaction (an interaction which can make reference 
to racial, religious or ethnic background and/or  characteristic), and the degree 
to which it can be regarded as racist. In fact, Rattansi notes that ‘racialization’ 
does not necessarily  imply that  those  subjected to it are regarded as inferior 
(2007: 107). There  is no attempt at one definitive understanding or measure  of 
‘racism’. In a nutshell, racialization is a looser concept  than racism and refers 
to a variety (and  varying degrees) of racial thinking  and attributions. 
In  using  this  term,  a  number of  more  postmodern scholars,  such  as Ali 
Rattansi, have argued  for the need to move away from the absolutes  of racists 
versus non-racists, as this way of understanding the  world is said to be inef- 
fective in capturing the much messier, more contradictory, and varied attitudes 
and beliefs that many people  hold today. According  to Ali Rattansi (2007: 2): 
 
. . . [I]t is my view that public and academic debates  should move away from 
simplistic  attempts to  divide  racism  from  non-racism  and  racists  from 
  
 
non-racists . . . one of the main impediments to progress  in understanding 
racism has been the willingness of all involved to propose short, supposedly 
water-tight definitions  of racism  and  to identify  quickly  and  with more  or 
less  complete   certainty  who  is  really  racist  and  who  is  not  [emphasis 
original]. 
 
Rattansi’s important observation applies to the growing number of cases in 
which less than  clear-cut  allegations of racism are on the rise, and subject  to 
wide public debate. For instance, in the summer of 2013, some people regarded 
the ‘go home  or face arrest’  poster  campaign  (now revoked) aimed  at illegal 
migrants  in the UK as ‘racist’ while others  saw it as a commonsense matter of 
upholding the law. One recent case reported in the daily London paper, Metro, 
concerned the case of a White hip-hop fan who had shouted ‘nigger’ (as a form 
of greeting) at a Black man in the street. Christopher Jones was charged  with 
the use of racially aggravated words when he was overheard using the term to a 
group of men, which included one Black man. However, Jones argued that he was 
not racist ‘because he likes rap music, “has more black friends than white friends”  
and  that  he had  used the  word as a “term  of endearment” ’ (Smith 
2012: 11). In agreement, magistrates in North  Staffordshire ruled  that  Jones 
had not used the term in a way which meant to be hostile to the Black man. As 
this example shows, the specifics of who (and in what context)  one says ‘nigger’ 
is crucial in judging whether someone is or is not being racist. 
In the  more  high profile  John  Terry/Anton Ferdinand feud, there  is little 
doubt  that Terry actually uttered racially abusive language  toward  Ferdinand. 
However, according to Rattansi, the distinction  between  a racist act and being a 
racist person is an important one, and he discusses the difficulty in judging 
people  as out  and  out  racists.  Rattansi draws  on  the  case  of football  com- 
mentator Ron Atkins, who (believing  the microphone was switched off) once 
described a Black  football  player  as ‘a fucking  lazy thick  nigger’ (Rattansi 
2007: 120). While  Atkins’  remarks are  undeniably offensive,  Rattansi notes 
that  some Black players  spoke  out in defense  of Atkins,  as he had helped  to 
promote Black  football  talent.  Rattansi concludes  that  (2007: 120–1): ‘. . . 
[football  commentator Ron Atkins],  like many others,  has contradictory and 
ambivalent responses to black people . . . Like most people  in Britain, he has 
culturally  absorbed both  sorts  of views . . .’. So, if we apply  Rattansi’s lens, 
even if we were  to agree  that Terry  behaved  in a racist manner  toward  Fer- 
dinand, this does not automatically mean that he behaves  in such a way 
(consistently) toward  other  Black or other  minority  ethnic  players  or people 
more  generally.  Nor  would  it  necessarily  mean  that  Terry  is definitively  a 
racist  person. 
With a few exceptions, the growing emphasis  on racialization, as opposed  to 
racism, has resulted in a broadening out of our understandings of racism, so 




White people  (or solely experienced by visibly non-White people). There is no 
singular way of being racist (see Rattansi 2007; Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1992; 
Solomos  and Back 1996), and various  British  scholars  have criticized  (albeit 
in  different  ways)  a  racial  binarism   which  has  traditionally conceived   of 
racialized  interactions in  terms  of  a  Black/White field (see  Modood 1994; 
Cohen  1996; Hickman  1998). Furthermore, the  essentialization of collective 
categories and identities,  including both White  and ethnic  minority  people,  is 
problematic (Gilroy  1998). 
Accompanying the rise of a broad  understanding of racialization, feminist 
scholars  adopting intersectionality in their  analyses  of racialized  experiences 
have increasingly  argued  that  racial experiences cannot  be understood solely 
in relation to ‘race’. For instance, in the USA, Patricia Hill Collins’ (2000) work 
on the matrix of interrelated oppressions has been highly influential, especially 
among  feminist  scholars. In Britain,  Coretta Phillips  (2011) has also empha- 
sized an intersectional analysis, and has argued  for the importance of examin- 
ing the role of racialization at the micro, meso, and macro  levels if we are to 
make  sense of long standing  inequalities found  among ethnic  groups, such as 
in educational attainment. Anthias and  Yuval-Davis (1992: 2) contend that 
various  ‘modes  of exclusion,  inferiorization, subordination and  exploitation’ 
can involve differing  levels of severity, and are ‘differentially  experienced by 
different class, ethnic  and gender  categories’.  Like Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 
Rattansi (2007) ‘. . . does not assume that racism is simply a property of white 
cultures and individuals’ and argues ‘. . . that racism has always been bound up 
with a myriad other divisions, especially those of class and gender’ (see also 
Hickman  1998; Cohen  and  Bains  1988). Furthermore, some  analysts  such as 
Andreas Wimmer  (2013) have  recently  argued  that  social scientists  need  to 
consider the possibility that ‘race’ and racisms may not always be centrally 
implicated  in the social dynamics  and divisions we witness across contempo- 
rary societies. 
These writings suggest that, in Britain, an overly homogenizing ‘one size fits 
all’ understanding of racism, as elaborated by some  analysts, is problematic. 
While such conceptions of racism, conceived primarily as structured systems of 
power in which White people have historically benefited, are still necessary (as I 
argue below), they are not particularly helpful in making sense of the myriad 
racial incidents  which now occur in multi-ethnic societies, where the actors in 
these incidents  are not always easily categorized in relation to the majority  or 
minority  groups, or as the oppressors or the oppressed. 
In most theorizing on racialization, it is now generally  accepted (in Britain) 
that ethnic minorities  too are capable  of racist acts and behaviours. However, 
the theoretical emphasis on ‘racialization’ has inadvertently resulted in a situa- 
tion  where  the  relativistic  bent  of racialization has  collapsed  multiple  and 
variable  forms of racial phenomena (including  assertions of ‘reverse racism’) 
into an undifferentiated mass which requires more  critical scrutiny. 
  
 
Given  the plethora of competing  definitions  and the varied  ways in which 
claims of racism  are  made,  a refocusing  and  rethinking of racism, as a more 
specific form  of racialization, helps  us to assess the  myriad  claims of racism 
made  in contemporary Britain. While no one definition  of racism can be held 
to a gold standard of utility, we need some basic guidelines  on the criteria  we 
use in assessing the many racial interactions and incidents which are said to be 
racist: when  are  certain  forms of racialization racist, or on the ‘hard’ end  of 
racism?  Equally,  when may it be inappropriate or inaccurate to label certain 
interactions or people  as racist? How does the recognition that ethnic minor- 
ities too can commit racist acts inform our understanding of racism? 
Most contemporary British  writings about  racism have not yet sufficiently 
examined assertions of ‘reverse  racism’ (especially  in comparison to scholar- 
ship on race in the US), which are increasingly  reported in the popular press; 
nor has there  been  much thought given to instances  of interethnic (or intra- 
ethnic)  conflict and  tension  in British  society. In order  to challenge  a wide- 
spread  culture  of racial equivalence, in which all interactions involving some 
reference to race or cultural  difference is deemed racist, or just one of many 
putatively similar forms of racialization, we need to go further and delineate by 
what criteria an interaction, person, policy or way of thinking  can be said to be 
racist. In the remainder of the paper, I discuss and evaluate  several high profile 
‘racist’ incidents which have been widely reported in the British media (includ- 
ing some allegations made against ethnic minority people) in order to illustrate 
why we need  to curb such a culture  of racial equivalence. In doing so, I draw 
especially upon Omi and Winant’s conceptualizations of racism and ‘racial 
projects’. 
 
Contesting easy equivalences 
 
Emblematic of the broadening out of understandings of racism in Britain, the 
‘Stephen  Lawrence Inquiry’ (1999) (commonly known as the Macpherson 
Report) defined  a racist incident  as follows: ‘A racist incident  is any incident 
which is perceived to be racist by the victim or other person’. In this definition, 
there  is no suggestion  that  the victim of such an incident  is necessarily  non- 
White. The report’s definition of a ‘racist incident’ is not useful for either  legal 
prosecution or academic  debates,  as it is overly broad  and ‘wishy-washy’. So, 
broadly conceived, this definition of a racist incident exemplifies the current 
tendency to  impute   equivalence to  all  racialized   acts  and  interactions  in 
Britain,  encouraging a culture  of racial equivalence. But, as discussed  above, 
not all racialized  interactions are necessarily  racist, and they may differ in 
motivations, consequences and  severity. The Macpherson view that  any inci- 
dent  can be racist, subject  to the perception of the actors, militates  against  a 
reasoned argument for why an instance of racialization is racist, or in what way 




Such a culture  of racial equivalence can permeate any sphere  of social life. 
Last year, my son (who attended a predominantly White  primary  school) 
informed  me  that  his White  friend  said  that  White  people  were  victims  of 
racism, and that calling White people  a ‘snowball’ would be racist (see Troyna 
and Hatcher 1992). I was assured  that  this claim was not in jest. While such a 
term, if delivered  with enough  venom, may be hurtful  to a White child, it does 
not  have  the  deep  resonance or stigma  attached to words  like ‘Jew’, ‘Paki’, 
‘nigger’ and  ‘chink’. There  can  be  no  easy,  two-way  equivalences between 
terms like ‘snowball’ and the many racial terms of denigration levied at various 
ethnic  minority  people  historically  (Feagin  2000). Though  not  discussed  by 
Rattansi, a corollary  of his binary  transcending framework, then, is that  sim- 
plistic assertions of ‘reverse racism’ can also be problematic. 
We  now  regularly  witness  remarks which  allege  the  equivalence of  any 
colour-based  remarks,  including   those   about   White   people.   For  instance, 
in response to the Terry/Ferdinand feud, Dave Whelan  (Wigan Athletic 
chairperson) said: 
 
I think we should forget colour and . . . you know, it doesn’t bother anybody. 
Sometimes a footballer, when they’re playing at such a level, with the stress 
there is. . . . If they call somebody White, if they call somebody  Black, you’ve 
just got to get on with it. 
 
Like the prior example, this statement suggests an equivalence between  calling 
someone Black and calling someone White  (both  in terms  of the morality  of 
the  act  itself,  as  well  as  the  assumed  impact  of  calling  someone White  as 
opposed  to calling someone Black). Such advocates of a colour-blind approach 
typically understand any racial terms and interactions as equivalents (The 
Guardian  2011; Bonilla-Silva  2010). In  their  critique  of  the  contemporary 
ubiquity of ‘diversity’ in a multitude of writings and policies, Alana Lentin and 
Gavan  Titley  (2008) make  a similar  observation about  the  way in which  a 
diluted, yet all-inclusive notion  of ‘diversity’, tends to reduce  all such diversity 
into  a bland  kind  of equivalence: ‘However,  what  this inclusivity potentially 
does is firstly to equalise  all differences, and secondly, to reduce  all inequality 
to   difference’.   So   the   specificity   of   particular  bases   of   diversity   (e.g. 
racialization, versus  sexism), tend  to be equalized and  obscured by a bland 
‘celebration of human  diversity  writ large’ (2008: 19). 
Central to the growth of this culture  of racial equivalence are assertions of 
both  racism and reverse  racism via new(ish)  communication and media tech- 
nologies which have instant reach to a huge audience. Typically, such charges of 
racism  (and  reverse  racism)  tend  to be monolithic, and  delivered  in formats 
which are not conducive  to the elaboration of detailed and careful argumen- 
tation  and explanations; as such, these  brief articles, blogs, and tweets  do not 
properly assess the  nature and  specifics of each  racial  interaction or  event. 
Furthermore, claims of ‘reverse  racism’ can be misleading  because  the  term 
  
 
suggests an automatic (and unqualified) parity and likeness between  racial 
infractions  committed by disparate groups of people, with often very different 
motivations, histories,  and  social  experiences. While  both  White  and  ethnic 
minority  people  are capable of acting in a racist manner,  it is imperative that 
we are clear about why, and in what ways, particular interactions or policies 
constitute racism as such. 
A culture  of racial  equivalence is evident  in the  ways in which some high 
profile  cases  are  reported in the  UK  media.  For  instance,  in January 2012, 
Black Labour MP Dianne Abbott responded to a Black freelance  journalist’s 
comment  that many of the Black leaders shown in the media were out of touch 
with the people  they supposedly represented. In response to this journalist’s 
critical commentary, Abbott later tweeted: ‘White people  love playing “divide 
and rule”. We should not play their game’. This remark led some (including an 
Asian Conservative MP, Nadhim  Zahawi)  to call for her resignation, dubbing 
her remarks as ‘racist’. The MP, Zahawi,  wrote  on Twitter: ‘A healthy  society 
should not tolerate any form of racism. DAbbott should apologise  and resign 
or Ed M must sack her.’ (www.telegraph.co.uk – 06/01/2012). Leaving aside the 
fact that party politics underlies  Zahawi’s cry of racism, no one publicly chal- 
lenged his allegation (other than Abbott), and the Labour leader  Ed Miliband 
reportedly insisted  upon  a public apology for her statement. 
Abbott’s remark certainly  racially essentializes  White people  (and is thus a 
form  of racialization) – but  can we say that  it is racist?  As discussed  above, 
forms of racialization can be seen on a continuum of soft to ‘hard’ racism 
(Rattansi 2007). Omi and Winant’s definition of racism provides a helpful way 
to differentiate racism from the broader notion  of racialization. According  to 
their definition, essentialist categories of race, while objectionable, are not 
sufficient, on their own, to constitute racism; rather, they must be used in a way 
that  creates  or reproduces structures of domination. Returning to the Terry/ 
Ferdinand feud, Terry  would be viewed as racist in this interaction if what he 
appears to  have  said  to  Anton  Ferdinand communicates an  attribution  of 
racial  inferiority, and  this act reproduces structures of domination in which 
White people  have historically  denigrated Black and other  minority  people. 
By comparison, if we examine  the Abbott tweet, there  is no doubt  that she 
employs  essentialist categories of race, in which all White  people  are charac- 
terized   as  opportunistically  engaging  in  behaviour which  will  divide  and 
damage Black people and their collective ties. But her tweet does not meet the 
second  part  of Omi  and Winant’s  definition  concerning the  reproduction of 
structures of domination. So not all racial generalizations – even ones deemed 
objectionable – are necessarily racist. Nor does Abbott’s tweet qualify as racist 
if one  were  to apply  the  Macionis  and  Plummer  definition  discussed  above 
(‘. . . racism refers to the belief that one racial category  is innately  superior or 
inferior to another’), because her generalization about White people makes no 




anything, her tweet articulates her view that White people  and institutions can 
employ a divisive tactic which disadvantages Black people – it is a commentary 
(however accurate  or not) about  the historical  structure of White domination, 
and exemplifies the use of a knowing strategic essentialism  to make a political 
point. Thus racial essentialisms (even  of a negative  nature), on their  own, do 
not constitute a sufficiently robust criteria for how we define ‘racism’, as not all 
racial essentialisms create  or reproduce structures of domination, or damage 
and  denigrate their  target  populations to  the  same  degree  (or  in the  same 
ways). 
One  important coda to the John Terry/Anton Ferdinand saga was that  Rio 
Ferdinand  (also  a  football   player),  the  brother of  Anton  Ferdinand,  was 
charged  with misconduct by the  Football  Association. Rio  Ferdinand found 
himself denying  that  he was being racist toward  Ashley  Cole, a ‘mixed race’ 
player  for Chelsea  (and  a team-mate of Terry’s, who testified  on his behalf). 
The  charge  against  Rio  Ferdinand arose  from  the  fact  that  Ferdinand had 
affirmed a tweeter’s  reference to Cole as a ‘choc ice’. The person  who tweeted 
Rio Ferdinand had written: ‘Looks like Ashley  Cole’s going to be their  choc 
ice. Then  again  he’s always been  a sell out. Shame  on him.’ Ferdinand then 
responded to this tweet: ‘I hear you fella! Choc ice is classic! Hahahahahaha!!’ 
(Steinberg 2012). When  accused  of being  racist  (for  endorsing this  tweet’s 
characterization of Cole), Ferdinand retorted that far from being racist, his use 
of the term ‘choc ice’ simply meant  that he was calling Ashley Cole ‘a fake’ – 
that  is, not being authentically Black: ‘ “What  I said yesterday is not a racist 
term”, he tweeted. “It’s a type of slang/term  used by many for someone who is 
being fake. So there.” ’ (Steinberg 2012). 
This scenario  is fascinating: Rio Ferdinand, who is ‘mixed race’ (Black  and 
White),  is accused of being racist toward  another ‘mixed race’ player, Ashley 
Cole, because  he had endorsed the term ‘choc ice’, which is commonly  used to 
mean ‘black on the outside, but white on the inside’. Ferdinand denies that his 
use of this term  is racist. Clearly, the term ‘choc ice’ is pejorative; this term  is 
not used in relation to the wider population – it is a term reserved specifically 
for Black people  who are seen as ‘sell outs’ or ‘race traitors’. 
Thus, the charge  of racism against  Rio Ferdinand is based  upon  the use of a 
term  which evokes  colour  (Black  on the  outside,  but White  on the  inside) and  
notions  of racial  essentialism  and  authenticity – that  while someone is actually  
Black,  he  is ‘acting’ White,  and  effectively  serving  White  interests. There  are  
a number of problematic aspects  of such attributions (and  termi- nology). For 
one, the ‘choc ice’ term (or ‘oreo’, ‘coconut’, ‘banana’ – a cognate term   used  in  
reference  to  East  Asian-origin  people)   references  entirely reductive  and 
essentialist understandings of who someone is: i.e. one cannot be both  Black 
and White – rather, someone is either  Black or White. So such terms  reinscribe 
quite  dated  understandings of static and mutually  exclusive racial  selves. 
  
 
The claim that Rio Ferdinand is racist for agreeing with the tweet is patently 
absurd  – Ferdinand’s implied  charge  of ‘race traitor’  or lack of racial authen- 
ticity (toward Cole)  does involve racially essentializing  Cole, but it does not 
reproduce structures of domination; nor does it refer to a belief in the inherent 
racial inferiority of Ashley  Cole. It is an admittedly crude  and politicized  jab 
which draws on the idea of not only racial authenticity but also an enforced 
racial solidarity  (a theme  in common  with Abbott’s tweet  above).  Rio Ferdi- 
nand is not a racist in this interaction; nor is Ashley Cole a victim of his racism. 
But Ferdinand is giving credence to (as evoked  by the tweeter’s  use of ‘choc- 
ice’)  essentialist  understandings  of  racial  categories,  such  as  ‘Black’  and 
‘White’. Now, if Ferdinand had said that Cole was not a credible  witness in the 
John Terry case because  he was Black and therefore unintelligent, that would 
have been  a racist remark. 
We need to retain  the use of the terms ‘racism’ and ‘racist’ but we should be 
clear about  why a form of ‘racialization’  (a broader, more  neutral term)  con- 
stitutes an instance of ‘racism’, for instance, by applying specific criteria such as 
theorized by Omi  and Winant. And  we should  use a wider  and  more  varied 
vocabulary to distinguish  between  a variety  of racial phenomena, e.g. ethno- 
centrism  or  xenophobia directed at  recent  Eastern European migrants.  For 
instance,  British  Indian  parents who  want  their  daughter or  son  to  marry 
another Indian-origin person  can be said to be ethnocentric, but  not  neces- 
sarily ‘racist’ – yet such an attitude is often  automatically labelled  as racist in 
the  British  press.  If  these  parents were  opposed   to  their  child  marrying 
someone of a different ethnic  or racial background (e.g. someone Black Car- 
ibbean  or  Chinese) because  they  believed  such  a  person  to  be  inherently 
inferior  (in some way), such a view would be racist because  such an antipathy 
toward  Black  or Chinese  people  reproduces ideologies  concerning inherent 
racial  differences and  racial  inferiority – which reinforces (historical) struc- 
tures  of domination. But  if these  same  parents objected to  a White  son  or 
daughter in law, because  they saw White British culture  as objectionable, this 
would not necessarily  be racist, for such a view does not create  or reproduce 
structures of domination. You  could  say, however,  that  these  Indian  parents 
were  being  ethnocentric and  prejudiced against  White  people,  as all White 
people  and ‘culture’  are  essentialized in an unfavourable way. Furthermore, 
forms  of racial hostility  (e.g. as evidenced by some  ethnic  minority  people 
toward White people)  should  not be conflated  with racism as such. 
The substantial insights gained by writings on racialization should not mean 
that we should jettison  our use of the term ‘racism’, especially an understand- 
ing of racism which highlights  the historical  context  and ‘structures  of domi- 
nation’  (as elaborated by Omi and Winant  1994). Theorizing on racialization 
which emphasizes the  ambivalence and  contradictions embedded in individ- 
uals’ racial attitudes and behaviours has enabled us to analyse multiple  racial 




highly individualistic  and privatized understanding of ‘racism’ which obscures 
conceptualizations of racism as structured systems of power  and domination 




Race consciousness, ‘reverse racism’, and historical amnesia 
 
Another example of a growing culture of racial equivalence is the tendency to 
regard  all race conscious policies as instances  of ‘reverse racism’. In the wake 
of anti-racist legislation and the post-civil rights era, there has been a backlash 
against race-conscious policies, and recurring  moral panics about  immigration 
and social cohesion  are unlikely to abate  (Finney  and Simpson 2009; McGhee 
2005). Some analysts  wish to claim that  we now (or should)  occupy a colour 
blind society (see Ignatieff  1999). Barack  Obama’s  2008 election  to the White 
House has bolstered some neo-conservative analysts’ claims that ethnic minor- 
ities are no longer disadvantaged, and that we now inhabit  a post-racial  world 
(see Browne  and Carrington’s 2012 special issue contesting  such assertions). 
Some analysts  have asserted that  we should  and need  to go ‘beyond’ race to 
achieve  a truly  equal  and  tolerant society  (see  Mirza  2010; Malik  1996). In 
Britain, Munira Mirza (2010), the Deputy Mayor for Education and Culture  of 
London, argued  in a special issue of Prospect magazine: ‘Does this heightened 
awareness  of racism  help  to  stamp  it out?  Quite  the  opposite. It  creates  a 
climate  of suspicion and anxiety.’ (Mirza 2010: 3). 
Increasingly,  race  conscious  policies  are  seen  as problematic. However,  as 
discussed above, not all forms of racialization (or representations or projects of 
race) are necessarily  racist (Omi and Winant 1994). As Amy Gutmann (1996), 
among others, has argued, forms of race consciousness (such as in forms of 
affirmative  action  – which are increasingly  embattled in the USA, and effec- 
tively illegal in Europe) may be important for a more  socially just society: 
 
But color blindness  is not a fundamental principle of justice. . . . Fairness is a 
fundamental principle of justice . . . and it is a principle that does not always 
call for color blindness, e.g. in relation to employment, education, or univer- 
sity admissions  in our nonideal society. To respond to racial injustice with a 
color conscious principle  or policy is therefore not to commit any wrong at 
all, provided the principle  or policy is consistent with fairness. (1996: 107) 
 
Ronald Dworkin also argued  that  race conscious  distinctions are not gen- 
erally  wrong  because  there  is a difference between  racial  distinctions that 
reflect prejudice  against members  of a disadvantaged group  (and  are used to 
perpetuate the disadvantage) and distinctions that are designed  to redress the 
disadvantage (Dworkin, cited in Gutmann 1996: 118). 
However, determining (consistently) which race conscious policies and proj- 
ects are  justified  is highly contested, and  we must  assess the  objectives  and 
  
 
consequences of each ‘racial project’ carefully. A rethinking of contemporary 
racial projects is pressing because in comparison with the recent  past, the ‘old’ 
polarities  of White/non-White, or what we mean by ‘ethnic minority’, have 
become categories which are constituted by highly diverse people, especially in 
terms of class and privilege, ethnicity, and various  forms of belonging. 
So while a shift toward a broader and more nuanced understanding of racism 
has occurred among many British scholars, so that we are better able to theorize 
specific racial incidents involving sometimes  contradictory and ambivalent 
people, we also need to retain  an understanding of racism which is not overly 
relativized  or solely individualistic  in emphasis – racism as a structured system 
of power and domination (while changeable) which has a historical  basis. 
Furthermore, assertions of reverse racism often fail to consider  the historically 
specific ways in which racial hierarchies and inequalities were institutionalized. 
The concept of racism cannot be understood in a wholly abstract, formulaic way, 
divorced  from the lengthy  history  in which beliefs and practices  about  racial 
inferiority and  superiority emerged and  were  consolidated. Whether this  is 
understood in relation to the treatment of Black pupils in British education (see 
Gillborn 2008), the racialized stop and search tactics which disproportionately 
target  ethnic  minorities  (Bowling  1998; Phillips  2011), the  Holocaust, or the 
transatlantic slave trade,  the historical  context  in which White  racisms (in its 
myriad  forms)  have  occurred cannot  be  erased  or  replicated. For  instance, 
Mugabe’s  policies  in Zimbabwe are  racially  discriminatory, in that  they  dis- 
criminate against White people,  qua their Whiteness. This treatment of White 
farmers  in Zimbabwe is reprehensible, and racially discriminatory, but to see 
their  treatment (for instance) as the mirror  equivalent of former  Rhodesia’s 
treatment of  Black  people   would  be  wrong-headed, and  would  erase  the 
historical  context  and weight of colonial history. The treatment of White land- 
owners is political retribution (however wrong it may be), and is not motivated 
by the long-standing belief that they are racial vermin. 
 
As Desmond and Emirbayer (2009) argue, 
there  is no such thing as ‘black institutional racism’ or ‘reverse institutional 
racism’ due to the fact that there is no existing history of a socially ingrained 
and  normalized system  of domination designed  by people  of colour  that 
denies White people  full participation in the rights and privileges of society. 
. . . (Also, see Cashmore and Troyna  (1990)). 
 
So while there  are  practices  and  policies  which can formally  discriminate 
against or disadvantage White people, on the basis of their Whiteness (and are 
thus  racially discriminatory), this does  not  necessarily  constitute ‘racism’ as 
such – though,  increasingly, ‘White’ is not an uncontested category. We must 
attune ourselves  to the  qualitatively different motivations, historical  experi- 
ences and consequences of such behaviours, practices,  and policies which are 






Widespread and  frequent allegations of ‘racism’ in Britain  are  increasingly 
played  out  in popular cultural  forms  such  as football,  or  in debates  about 
whether a reality TV contestant is or is not racist. To claim that an interaction 
is ‘racist’ no longer  tells us very much, as such assertions are so rife. Further- 
more, the ways in which we digest and interpret such interactions are compli- 
cated by the fact that they can go viral via new media technologies (e.g. Twitter, 
You Tube)  which involve  multiple  layers of allegation and  reportage. So we 
need to pay more attention to why and how someone or something  is said to 
be racist, or somehow  constitutes an instance  of racism. Given  the numerous 
reported instances of racism, which have been alleged in relation to both White 
and  ethnic  minority   Britons,  understandings of  racism  must  consider   the 
complex histories, positionings, behaviours, and consequences of such a diverse 
range of racial interactions and phenomena. 
The trend  toward  growing equivalence in how racism is understood (as 
experienced by almost  anyone,  and  understood to apply  to a wide array  of 
interactions involving almost any utterance of racial terms and attributions)  is 
worrying, as it denudes the idea of racism of its historical  basis, severity  and 
power. These  frequent and  commonplace assertions of racism  in the  public 
sphere  paradoxically end  up  trivializing  and  homogenizing quite  different 
forms  of  racialized   interactions. Not  all  forms  of  racialization constitute 
‘racism’ because not all racially based modes of thinking or behaving are based 
upon  the  belief  that  human  beings  can be differentiated according  to essen- 
tialist understandings of inferior  or superior racial groupings; nor do all forms 
of racialization create or reproduce structures of domination. As such, we need 
to retain  both  a nuanced  understanding of racial incidents (helpfully  brought 
about  through Rattansi’s theorizing of ‘racialization’)  and an historical  under- 
standing  of racism in which  essentialist categories of race  are  employed to 
create  or reproduce structures of domination (Omi  and Winant  1994). 
The tendency to call all racially based policies ‘racist’ undermines the legiti- 
mate  need  to (selectively)  retain  race  consciousness  (Gutmann 1996) – this 
should not be conflated with ‘racism’ or ‘reverse racism’. For now, some degree 
of racial awareness  (though what concrete form this should  take  is of course 
subject  to debate) is necessary  for addressing  racially  based  inequalities. As 
Omi  and Winant  have  argued,  racial  projects  can be progressive, as well as 
reinforce racial inequalities. So Ignatieff  (1999) is wrong: there  isn’t too much 
race – there  is, however, too much ‘loose talk’ and indiscriminate assertions of 
racism. 
The considerable challenge  for future  theorizing in this area  is to connect 
forms of racialization and racism (in combination with other  key variables) at 
the micro, meso and macro  levels (Phillips  2011). Much of the future  debate 
concerning racism  in  Britain  will concern  the  degree  to  which  we  should 
  
 
highlight White  people  and White  supremacy in our  analyses  of ‘racism’. In 
fact, in a recent  symposium  in the  journal  Ethnic  and  Racial  Studies, ‘race 
systems’ theorists like Feagin  and Elias (2013) argue  that  Omi and Winant’s 
racial  formation theory  does  not  sufficiently  specify White  supremacy and 
White privilege. 
We still need to ask: Who or what is engaged  in the racialized  act, and with 
what  purpose and  impact?  What  is the  content and  impact  of this racialized 
act/behaviour/or policy, and does it create  or reproduce structures of domina- 
tion (such as racial hierarchies)? What  is the historical  context  within which 
particular interactions and  beliefs  occur?   Posing  such  questions  militates 
against  the  assertion of easy  equivalences in relation to  disparate forms  of 
racialized  phenomena and  interactions. At  the  same time, in addition  to the 
material  consequences of structured inequalities, it is crucial that  we discern 
the motivations, agendas, and back stories to social phenomena which are said 
to be racist. To do so would strengthen, not weaken, our ability to make claims 
about  racism taken  seriously. 
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